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WAKE UP AND SMELL THE STARBUCKS 
COFFEE: HOW DOE v. STARBUCKS 
CONFIRMS THE END OF “THE AGE  
OF CONSENT” IN CALIFORNIA  
AND PERHAPS BEYOND 
Jennifer Ann Drobac* 
Abstract: Since 2005, California civil courts have effectively abandoned 
the “age of consent” set by former California statutory rape law and, ar-
guably, encoded in current penal code sex crime provisions. In declaring 
that California civil law may credit a child’s consent to sex with an adult, 
courts conflate or confuse legal consent, capacity, and acquiescence. 
Given that California federal antidiscrimination cases have begun to treat 
minors like fully mature adults, other states may adopt these dangerous 
precedents. This Article analyzes both California and United States Su-
preme Court cases to conclude that a strict liability civil law approach to 
juvenile acquiescence to sex with an adult would better serve developing 
teenagers. Brief exploration of adolescent assent, a new mechanism based 
in traditional contract law for dealing with the decisions of maturing 
teenagers, also justifies review of the current approaches in California 
and across the nation. 
Introduction 
 A Google search for “the age of consent” yields results indicating 
the age as sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen in the United States, depend-
ing on the state.1 These sites specify the age at which California consid-
 
 
* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Robert H. McKinney School of Law; J.S.D., 
Stanford Law School. My sincerest gratitude to my readers: Professors Shawn Boyne, 
Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Lahny Silva, and R. George Wright who all reviewed and com-
mented upon earlier drafts. Additional thanks to Miriam Murphy, Associate Director of the 
IU McKinney, Lilly Law Library, Sierra Bee, Julia Hill, Esq., and Dina Hoffman, Esq. for 
their expert assistance. I dedicate this Article to the Starbucks baristas and millions of 
“McTeens.” 
1 See, e.g., Ages of Consent in North America, Wikipedia: the free encyclopedia, http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ages_of_consent_in_North_America (last modified Dec. 9, 2012, 
11:48 AM); Worldwide Ages of Consent, Avert, http://www.avert.org/age-of-consent.htm 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2012). The “age of consent” commonly refers to the age at which a 
minor (someone under eighteen years old) may legally consent to engage in sexual activity 
with an adult and, thereby, insulate that adult from criminal prosecution. See Age of Consent, 
Wiktionary: the free dictionary, en.wiktionary.org/wiki/age_of_consent (last modi-
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33:1 
ers it permissible for someone to engage in sexual activity with an adult 
as eighteen, the age of majority.2 A 2009 California federal district 
court ruled in Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., however, that a person under eight-
een may legally consent to sex.3 In support of its decision, the Starbucks 
court cited People v. Tobias, a 2001 California Supreme Court criminal 
case.4 Tobias and Starbucks mark changes in California law and may have 
legal implications across the nation.5 
 Before Part I of this Article delves into the California case law in-
terpretation of juvenile “consent” to sexual activity, it explores defini-
tions. I use quotations with adolescent “consent” because even explicit 
verbal consent by a minor may not constitute legal consent and may 
equate more realistically with acquiescence.6 Having established a 
common vocabulary, Part I analyzes the Tobias case and its treatment of 
California Penal Code section 261.5, which criminalizes “consensual” 
sex between an adult and a minor. Part I contrasts the Tobias dictum 
with case precedent that acknowledges environmental factors that may 
influence “consent,” namely, “communal experience” concerning ado-
lescent decision making and abusive forces that corrupt autonomous 
teenaged choices. 
 Part II challenges the Tobias majority’s conclusions by reviewing 
historical interpretations of California Penal Code section 261.5. More 
particularly, Part II revisits both the United States Supreme Court and 
the California Supreme Court decisions in Michael M. v. Superior Court of 
Sonoma County, a case in which both courts evaluated the meaning and 
                                                                                                                      
fied Dec. 13, 2012 02:22 PM) (“[Age of consent] is used to indicate the age at which it is 
no longer a crime for someone else to engage in consensual sexual intercourse with the 
person who is still younger than the age of consent . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). But see 
Donaldson v. Dep’t of Real Estate, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 588–89 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting 
while “age of consent” has often been used by courts “as shorthand for the age below 
which . . . sexual relations would support a charge for statutory rape,” the phrase may refer 
to the age at which a minor can legally consent to marry). 
2 See Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a) (West Supp. 2012); see, e.g., Ages of Consent in North 
America, supra note 1; Worldwide Ages of Consent, supra note 1. 
3 No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL 5183773, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009). 
4 See id.; People v. Tobias, 21 P.3d 758, 761 (Cal. 2001). 
5 In a similar article, I discuss the criminal and civil law conflicts concerning the age of 
consent in New York. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, 
Teenagers, and the Sting to “The Age of Consent,” 20 J.L. & Pol’y 63, 90–95 (2011) [hereinafter 
Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction]. Taken together, these articles demonstrate a 
disturbing trend regarding the age of consent in criminal and civil laws. See id. 
6 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59, 68 (1986) (determining respon-
dent’s voluntary participation in the sexual activity in question irrelevant to an evaluation 
of the unwelcomeness of sexual conduct under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 
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legislative intent of section 261.5.7 These high court precedents dem-
onstrate the inconsistent and radically novel approach taken by the To-
bias court to section 261.5 when it declared that minors might have the 
capacity to give legal consent to sex. 
  Next, Part III traces the end of the “age of consent” in California 
and supportive or associated court decisions. Part III examines how 
California civil courts relied on the Tobias dictum so that California now 
treats adolescent “consent” in seemingly irrational and contradictory 
ways. Part III also elucidates how state criminal and civil law influenced 
federal law. Thus, what began as an isolated problem in California could 
conceivably spread throughout the federal system. Lastly, Part III dem-
onstrates how recent treatment of adolescent “consent” across the na-
tion has influenced tort law and created misguided anti-discrimination 
law. The new tort and anti-discrimination precedents undermine pro-
tections established in state criminal codes that set ages of consent and 
allow for the prosecution of adult sexual predators. 
 Part IV concludes by reaffirming that a strict liability civil law ap-
proach to adolescent “consent” more effectively protects teenagers 
from sexual predators.8 This last part also explores “adolescent assent,” 
the mechanism of a new approach to adolescent “developing capac-
ity.”9 Introduced more fully in a separate article, adolescent assent bet-
ter serves teenagers and those interested in fostering emerging adult-
hood.10 Adolescents will engage in sex, sometimes with adults. The 
challenge is to protect teenagers while they explore the adult world. 
The adolescent assent proposal affords teenagers the chance to revoke 
their “consent” when an adult behaves abusively, takes unfair advan-
                                                                                                                      
7 See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 472 n.6 (1981); Mi-
chael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 601 P.2d 572, 576 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 450 U.S. 
464 (1981). 
8 Part IV is largely based on a previous article but, rather than reaching this conclusion 
by analyzing New York case law, I add a new dimension by considering recent, troubling 
decisions from California courts. See Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction, supra note 
5, at 90–95. 
9 See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and the Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and a Conflict of 
Laws, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 471, 518–19 (2004) [hereinafter Drobac, Sex and the Workplace] 
(introducing the notion of “developing capacity”). “Developing capacity” signifies the 
transitional status from childhood to adulthood and the concomitant developing maturity. 
Id. The concept is distinguished from “diminished capacity,” which carries a negative con-
notation, suggesting that capacity should exist or may once have existed. Id. at 518. “Most 
teenagers suffer not from impairment but from immaturity—a blameless condition and a 
natural phase of growth.” Id. 
10 See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Abandoning Teenage Consent for Legal Assent: Harmo-
nizing Developmental Sciences and the Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Drobac, Abandoning Teenage Consent for Legal Assent]. 
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tage, or breaches a duty owed to that minor. The assent approach con-
templates that adults will treat minors with care or will “just say no,” es-
pecially if the law permits maturing teenagers to revoke their “yes.” 
 Finally, I conclude by highlighting a proposal from my recent arti-
cle, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, Teenagers, and the Sting to 
“The Age of Consent.” That article analyzed trends in New York case law 
to conclude that the legal significance of adolescent “consent” renders 
adolescents and minors vulnerable.11 Here, by examining California 
law, I reach a similar conclusion. Adolescent “assent” better protects 
our minors and, thus, should be recognized by California courts and 
courts across the nation. 
I. Confusion About “Consent” and Consent in Civil  
and Criminal Law 
 In 2009, in Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., a California federal district court 
explored the issue of whether a minor could assert a sexual harassment 
claim against her employer and supervisor when she “consented” to the 
alleged offensive sexual conduct.12 In Starbucks, the legal significance of 
“consent” was pivotal; therefore, a review of definitions facilitates dis-
cussion of this case.13 
A. Acquiescence, Legal Consent, and Legal Capacity in Civil Law 
 Consent means to give “permission for something to happen . . . 
agree to do something.”14 Consent must be informed and correspond 
to the activity it legitimates.15 Ignorant cooperation does not indicate 
consent and any misrepresentation taints consent.16 The consenting 
individual must possess the cognitive ability to reason about a choice 
and must be able to guide his or her own responsive choices.17 Consent 
must derive from freedom of choice and volition.18 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction, supra note 5, at 90–95. 
12 No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL 5183773, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009). 
13 See id. 
14 The New Oxford American Dictionary 365 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate 
eds., 2001). 
15 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 892A(2)(b), 892B(1)–(2) (1979). 
16 See id. § 892B(2). 
17 Id. § 892A(2)(a) (noting that consent must be “by one who has the capacity to con-
sent or by a person empowered to consent for him”). 
18 See id. § 892B(3) (explaining that “[c]onsent is not effective if it is given under du-
ress”). 
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 Conversely, to acquiesce means to “accept something reluctantly 
but without protest.”19 This definition indicates less than full consent. 
To distinguish acquiescence, I would add another requirement for con-
sent: a measure of autonomy and power. For example, can society truly 
value the consent of a person who had no opportunity or authority to 
dissent? Consent must be free of duress and coercion.20 Arguably, con-
sent assumes a level of mutuality and equality between the parties com-
ing to an agreement or making a bargain. Consent presumes emo-
tional, intellectual, and developmental capacity.21 These characteristics 
undergird legal capacity.22 
 Federal courts have carefully examined acquiescence and consent 
in sexual harassment cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII).23 In 1998, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the 
U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the “objectionable environment 
must be both objectively” offensive (the “reasonableness” standard) 
“and subjectively offensive” (the “unwelcomeness” requirement).24 
State fair employment practice statutes that prohibit sexual harassment 
also make “unwelcomeness” an element of the prima facie case.25 Thus, 
in Starbucks, if Doe’s “consent” garnered legal significance, she would 
lose her sexual harassment case because the conduct was not subjec-
tively “unwelcome.”26 
 State sex crime statutes that specifically prohibit sexual conduct 
with minors complicate sexual harassment and sex-based tort cases.27 
Typically, a criminally-accused adult may not assert “consent” as a de-
fense.28 So what happens when criminal and civil claims stem from the 
same conduct? A review of recent California criminal and civil cases 
                                                                                                                      
19 The New Oxford American Dictionary, supra note 14, at 14. 
20 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B(2)–(3) (1979). 
21 See id. § 892A(2), § 892A cmt. b. 
22 The way that consent and acquiescence are defined shapes the legal discourse sur-
rounding statuary rape. See Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction, supra note 5, at 80–
85, 90–95. I have developed these definitions elsewhere and provide them again to empha-
size their import when addressing shifting norms of consent and statutory rape. See id. at 
80–85. 
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); see, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 787 (1998). 
24 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993)). 
25 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 (West 2011); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula 
Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 851 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding a claim of sexual harassment un-
der section 12940 requires “unwelcome” sexual harassment). 
26 See Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *158–59, *166. 
27 See Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 9, at 484 (noting the difference between 
the civil and criminal law treatment of consent by minors to sex). 
28 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 261.5 (West Supp. 2012). 
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shows that conflicts between civil and criminal law can lead to disparate 
results. 
B. Criminal Law—People v. Tobias 
 In 2001, in People v. Tobias, the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether a minor who gives “consent” to an in-
cestuous relationship is an accomplice under California Penal Code 
section 285.29 The court held that a child under the age of eighteen, 
who engages in a “sexual relationship with an adult is a victim, not a 
perpetrator,” regardless of the child’s consent.30 The court concluded 
that the adult, not the minor, bears the burden of refraining from a 
sexual relationship.31 
 The Tobias court relied on prior cases, including People v. Stratton 
and People v. Stoll to support its conclusion.32 Specifically, the Tobias 
court pointed to the Stratton court’s conclusion that, because minors 
are unable to legally consent to sexual intercourse, they cannot be 
criminally liable for incest.33 Still, the Tobias court undermined the 
Stratton line of cases with its discussion of the modification of the Cali-
fornia forcible rape statute, Cal. Penal Code section 261, and the pas-
sage of section 261.5 that prohibits unlawful sex with a minor.34 Section 
261.5(a) provides that: 
[u]nlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse 
accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the per-
petrator, if the person is a minor. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, a ‘minor’ is a person under the age of 18 years and an 
‘adult’ is a person who is at least 18 years of age. 35 
Subsequent subsections of this statute detail age differences between 
the juvenile and adult, levels of offense, and penalties.36 This provision 
did not exist in the Penal Code prior to 1970. Before then, unlawful sex 
                                                                                                                      
29 21 P.3d 758, 759 (Cal. 2001). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 761–62; see People v. Stratton, 75 P. 166, 168 (Cal. 1904) (holding that a 
woman too young to consent to sexual intercourse is not an accomplice to incest), super-
seded by statute, Cal. Penal Code § 261.5, as stated in Tobias, 21 P.3d at 758; People v. Stoll, 
257 P. 583, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (same), superseded by statute, Cal. Penal Code § 261.5, 
as stated in Donaldson v. Dep’t of Real Estate, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577 (Ct. App. 2005). 
33 Tobias, 21 P.3d at 761 (citing Stratton, 75 P. at 166). 
34 See id. at 761–62. 
35 Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
36 Id. § 261.5(b)–(e). 
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with a minor had been codified in section 261, which defined rape, in 
part, as “an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not 
the wife of the perpetrator . . . [w]here the female is under the age of 
eighteen years.”37 Although the two statutes appear almost identical, 
they are unique because the old version, section 261, fell within the 
forcible rape statute. The post-1970 version, section 261.5, stands alone 
and prescribes variations in the violation and penalties. 
 The Tobias court suggested that the statutory reforms of 1970 
marked the Legislature’s implicit rejection of incapacity among mi-
nors.38 Moreover, the Tobias court implied that these legislative reforms 
undermined the incest cases, including Stoll, which rejected the notion 
that “consenting” minors were accomplices.39 According to the Tobias 
court, “the Legislature created the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse 
with a minor ([section] 261.5) and amended the rape statute ([sec-
tion] 261) so that it no longer included sex with a minor in the defini-
tion of rape.”40 Consequently, the court posited that when a minor 
“knowingly and voluntarily” engages in a sexual act, the conduct may 
not equate to rape, but instead, a less serious crime.41 Although the To-
bias court noted that a minor may still be found incapable of providing 
legal consent, the court concluded that by making this change, the 
California Legislature “implicitly acknowledged that, in some cases at 
least, a minor may be capable of giving legal consent to sexual relations.”42 
 The court focused on behavior committed “knowingly and volun-
tarily,” arguably terms that closely track assent or acquiescence.43 
Slightly different from consent, assent means to “express approval or 
agreement . . . .”44 Under this definition, assent signifies cooperation or 
secondary status. It lacks the connotations of independence and inher-
ent capacity that accompany consent.45 
                                                                                                                      
37 Act of May 19, 1913, ch. 122, sec. 1, § 261, 1913 Cal. Stat. 212, 212 (amending sec-
tion 261 of the Penal Code relating to the crime of rape). 
38 Tobias, 21 P.3d at 762. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 761–62 (comparing Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(b)–(d) [offense classification 
and punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor], with Cal. Penal Code 
§ 264(a) (West 2008) [punishment for rape]). Note, the Tobias case dealt with violations of 
Cal. Penal Code § 285 (incest), not with § 261.5, thus much of this discussion was dictum. 
See id. at 759, 761–62. 
41 Id. at 762. 
42 Id. (emphasis added). 
43 See id. 
44 The New Oxford American Dictionary, supra note 14, at 96. 
45 See supra notes 14–28 and accompanying text. 
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 The court referred explicitly to legal consent, however, leaving no 
doubt that it did not mean assent or acquiescence.46 This reasoning, 
quoted in Starbucks, announces a new determination that contradicts 
over a hundred years of court precedent finding that girls under a 
specified age are unable to give consent as a matter of law, regardless of 
their actual “consent.”47 
C. Acquiescence, Legal Consent, and Legal Capacity—Civil and Criminal Law 
 Perplexingly, neither section 261.5 nor section 261 refers to a mi-
nor acting “knowingly and voluntarily.”48 We can distinguish these 
terms from legally binding consent, however, which presumes emo-
tional, intellectual, and developmental capacity, or essentially, legal ca-
pacity.49 In 2003, in People v. Hillhouse, a California appeals court evalu-
ated this issue in the context of an adult’s defense to an oral copulation 
charge involving a minor.50 The Hillhouse court explained that “‘legal 
consent presupposes an intelligence capable of understanding the act, 
its nature, and possible consequences.’”51 
 This explanation mirrors section 892A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts regarding consent, which specifies that, in order to extin-
guish liability, consent must be “by one who has the capacity to con-
sent.”52 Comment 2(b) of this section explains that the consent of a 
child “may still be effective if [the child] is capable of appreciating the 
nature, extent and probable consequences of the conduct consented to 
. . . .”53 Thus, the Restatement implicitly starts with the notion that most 
minors are not capable of consenting.54 
                                                                                                                      
46 See Tobias, 21 P.3d at 762 (“[A] minor may be capable of giving legal consent to sex-
ual relations.”) (emphasis added). 
47 See Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *7 (quoting Tobias, 21 P.3d at 761–62); see also, 
e.g., People v. Verdegreen 39 P. 607, 608 (Cal. 1895), superseded by statute, Cal. Penal Code  
§ 261.5 (West Supp. 2012), as stated in Tobias, 21 P.3d at 758 (“It is the declared policy of 
our law . . . that any female under the age there fixed shall be incapable of consenting to 
the act of sexual intercourse . . . .”). Note, it was not until 1993 that the California Legisla-
ture modified section 261.5 to make it gender neutral. See Act of Sept. 29, 1993, ch. 596, 
sec. 1, § 261.5, 1993 Cal. Stat. 3139 (amending section 261.5 of the Penal Code, relating to 
crime). 
48 See Cal. Penal Code §§ 261, 261.5 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). 
49 See People v. Hillhouse, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 268 (Ct. App. 2003). 
50 See id. at 263, 268. 
51 Id. at 268 (quoting People v. Griffin, 49 P. 711, 712 (Cal. 1897)). 
52 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A(2)(a) (1979). 
53 Id. § 892A(2) cmt. b (emphasis added). 
54 See id. 
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 Other articles have explored the neuroscientific and psychosocial 
evidence of whether adolescents are consistently capable of appreciat-
ing the nature, extent, and probable consequences of their decisions in 
order to regulate their behavior.55 Although adolescents have “develop-
ing capacity,” they are not consistently the functional equivalents of ma-
ture adults.56 Their “consent” is more like assent or acquiescence which 
carries no presumption of legal capacity. 
 Given the emphasis by both criminal and civil law on capacity, the 
differences between the Tobias concept of juvenile “consent” in Califor-
nia criminal and civil law is perplexing. One must consider whether the 
Tobias court conflated volitional acquiescence with legal consent. Did it 
simply follow California’s legislative lead and obscure the relation be-
tween legally binding consent and legal capacity? Confusion concern-
ing these similar but distinct concepts is common.57 In Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson, the 1986 U.S. Supreme Court case that first recognized 
workplace sexual harassment, the Court examined volition in its discus-
sion of unwelcomeness.58 There, the Court reasoned that acquiescence 
is not legal consent.59 Moreover, the Court refuted the district court’s 
opinion because it focused on the voluntariness of the plaintiff’s partici-
pation in the alleged sexual acts when the appropriate inquiry is 
whether or not the plaintiff indicated that the sexual advances were 
unwelcome.60 If an adult’s knowledge and voluntary participation in sex-
ual conduct does not necessarily equate with consent, then surely juve-
nile acquiescence and “consent” deserve special regard. 
                                                                                                                      
55 For a thorough, detailed, and updated discussion of the neurological and psychoso-
cial development of teenagers, see Jennifer Ann Drobac, Worldly But Not Yet Wise 
(Univ. of Chi. Press, under contract). See also Jennifer Ann Drobac, Consent, Teenagers, and 
(Un)Civil(ized) Consequences, in Children, Sex and the Law (Ellen Marrus & Sacha Coupet 
eds.) (forthcoming 2013); Jennifer Ann Drobac, I Can’t to I Kant: The Sexual Harassment of 
Working Adolescents, Competing Theories, and Ethical Dilemmas, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 675, 713–17 
(2007) [hereinafter Drobac, I Can’t to I Kant]. See generally Jennifer Ann Drobac, “Developing 
Capacity”: Adolescent “Consent” at Work, at Law, and in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. Davis J. 
Juv. L. & Pol’y 1 (2006) [hereinafter Drobac, Developing Capacity] (discussing new neuro-
scientific and psychosocial evidence regarding adolescent physical and psychosocial devel-
opment). 
56 See Drobac, Developing Capacity, supra note 55, at 19 (noting brains of adolescents 
continue developing into the adolescents’ twenties). 
57 See, e.g., Doe v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-09-03655-JSW (DMR), 2010 WL 
2524587, at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2010); Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *7–8. 
58 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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1. “Communal Experience” of Adolescence 
 The Hillhouse court did not need the new neuroscience literature 
to explain “communal experience” regarding adolescent capacity.61 
The court stated, “It is teenagers’ judgment and impulse control, not 
his or her knowledge or intelligence, which tend to be problematic.”62 
There, the court concluded that a minor’s consent to sexual contact is 
irrelevant given the “communal experience” that adolescents are less 
mature and responsible than adults.63 
 The Hillhouse court confirms a hundred years of common sense 
and observation, namely that teenagers are not always emotionally and 
developmentally mature enough to make wise choices, including per-
haps choices about sexual activity.64 According to this perspective, even 
adolescent sexual initiative with an adult deserves special treatment.65 
Thus, the Tobias court’s implication that adolescents might be ready for 
consensual sexual activity with an adult in the civil context, at the work-
place for example, but not under criminal law, challenges logic. 
2. Child Abuse and the Corruption of “Consent” 
 Another factor to consider in a discussion of adolescent “consent” 
is the sexual victimization of children, including teenagers. Sexual 
predators may manipulate children of all ages to extract “consent” or 
compliant cooperation.66 Many courts recognize the need for expert 
testimony regarding the methods employed by child molesters and the 
behavior of their targeted victims.67 One court explained “that the be-
havioral characteristics and psychological dynamics of child molestation 
victims are beyond the ken of the average juror.”68 
                                                                                                                      
61 Hillhouse, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 268–69 (quoting Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 
P.2d 797, 855 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., dissenting)). 
62 Id. 
63 See id. The court stated that: 
“[a]dolescents are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined 
than adults, and are without the same capacity to control their conduct and 
to think in long-range terms.” It is for those reasons that our laws governing 
sexual contact with minors make it irrelevant, as a general rule, whether the 
minor consented. 
Id. at 269 (quoting Lungren, 940 P.2d at 855 (Mosk, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted and 
first set of internal quotation marks omitted). 
64 See id. at 268–69. 
65 See id. 
66 See Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 975–76 (D.C. 2010). 
67 See, e.g., id. 
68 Id. at 978 n.17. 
2013] Doe v. Starbucks and the Age of Consent in California 11 
 In Jones v. United States, decided in March 2010, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia considered whether the admission 
of expert testimony in a case against a high school counselor and 
teacher accused of sexually assaulting three female students was a re-
versible error.69 The expert, Special Agent Kenneth Lanning, had 
twenty years of experience in the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit, focus-
ing on the sexual exploitation of minors.70 Lanning explained that at 
one end of the continuum are “situational offenders” who have no 
clear preference but opportunistically exploit children.71 At the other 
end, “preferential” predators target children consistently.72 
 The court recapped Lanning’s conclusions, namely that “preferen-
tial” child molesters manipulate and “groom” their victims who may 
eventually comply with the molesters’ advances.73 The court noted that, 
according to Lanning, these immature victims often delay reporting the 
abuse and sometimes provide inconsistent accounts of the abuse be-
cause their acquiescence produces shame and guilt.74 
 Lanning’s testimony clearly demonstrates that teenage acquies-
cence may result from predatory abuse.75 Lanning testified that most 
child molesters do not force themselves on children but bond with 
young victims to psychologically manipulate them.76 One might argue 
that this kind of abuse is worse than forcible rape. In these cases, the 
perpetrator uses the teenager to facilitate her own abuse.77 The adult 
leaves the teenager not only physically but also emotionally and psycho-
logically violated.78 
 The Jones court thoroughly recounted the grooming process as 
presented by Lanning.79 The court explained that the abuser identifies 
and attempts to fill a child’s needs, and in some cases molesters employ 
severe, unsavory tactics to coerce their victims.80 Teenagers from dys-
functional households are most susceptible to the grooming process.81 
                                                                                                                      
 
69 Id. at 972. 
70 Id. at 973, 979. 
71 Id. at 975–76, 976 n.8. 
72 Jones, 990 A.2d at 975–76. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 976. 
75 See id. at 975–76. 
76 Id. at 976. 
77 See id. 
78 See Jones, 990 A.2d at 976. 
79 See id. at 975–76. 
80 Id. at 976 (noting, molesters coerce, “for example by listening sympathetically to the 
child, complementing [sic] her on her looks, giving her hugs, and buying her things she 
needs” and in some instances, molesters will “expos[e] children to pornography, supply[] 
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 Lanning’s testimony sounds surprisingly similar to a Santa Cruz, 
California case, where a forty-year-old manager of a movie theater al-
legedly befriended teenaged employees, provided them with alcohol, 
gave them free theater tickets, and even offered to teach one, sixteen-
year-old Sara (an alias), to drive.82 This manager encouraged Sara “to 
speak with him about her problems, how her parents did not under-
stand her, and about things that mattered to her, a teenage girl.”83 He 
gave her expensive gifts, took her to nice dinners, and even gave her 
cash.84 Sara had no idea that her manager was a registered sex of-
fender, convicted of molesting his twelve-year-old niece.85 
 The manager lied to Sara after repeatedly soliciting sexual favors 
from her.86 He told her that he was suffering from a potentially inoper-
able brain tumor, and shortly thereafter suggested they go to a hotel to 
have sexual intercourse.87 Convinced that she loved her “desperately 
ill” manager, Sara eventually acquiesced.88 
 Sara became the compliant victim that Lanning described.89 The 
court recounted Lanning’s testimony, noting that “[t]he grooming 
process results in . . . ‘compliant victims’ —children who cooperate in 
their victimization. Their non-resistance may seem to indicate consent 
. . . ; indeed, the children may return to their abusers and even enjoy 
the sexual activity.”90 In Lanning’s testimony, he noted that “compliant 
victims suffer a lifetime of shame, embarrassment and guilt because 
their victimization does not fit society’s understanding that children do 
not willingly acquiesce in abuse.”91 The court noted that, “[a]ccording 
to Lanning, those feelings help explain why victimized children fail to 
disclose or delay disclosure of their abuse, and why their disclosures 
often contain ‘incomplete,’ ‘inaccurate,’ ‘distorted,’ or ‘contradictory’ 
                                                                                                                      
them with drugs and alcohol, blackmail[] them, and coerc[e] their silence by threats of 
suicide”). 
81 Id. at 976. 
82 Complaint at 2–9, Sara Doe [alias] v. Culver Theaters, Inc., No. 139513 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Sara Doe Complaint]. I note that I was personally involved 
in the preparation and filing of Sara Doe’s case while I was still in private practice. I did 
not, however, negotiate her case’s resolution as it was handled by independent counsel. 
83 Id. at 6. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 4. 
86 Id. at 6–7. 
87 Id. 
88 Sara Doe Complaint, supra note 82, at 6–7. 
89 See Jones, 990 A.2d at 975–76; Sara Doe Complaint, supra note 82, at 6–8. 
90 Jones, 990 A.2d at 976. 
91 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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information.”92 Lanning’s testimony, as summarized by the Jones court, 
clarified that although non-resistance may appear to indicate consent, 
in reality, it may indicate abuse and manipulation.93 
 Additionally, in a policy statement about sexual harassment, the 
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP) ex-
plained that children and adolescent victims commonly conceal the 
perpetrator’s offenses based on feelings of shame, fear, humiliation, and 
vulnerability.94 Children and adolescents may even believe that their 
behavior precipitated the sexual abuse.95 Often, the abuse is not re-
vealed for years, if ever.96 
 Lanning’s testimony coupled with the AACAP policy statement 
highlight how a manipulated teenager might respond to sexual abuse 
and harassment with acquiescence and later with shame and humilia-
tion, if not worse.97 After being kissed by her manager, Sara “remem-
ber[ed] feeling ‘numb’ at first. Everything was moving so quickly. Every-
thing was a blur to her.”98 When Sara’s brother, also a theater employee, 
observed the manager kissing his sister in a storage room, the manager 
again lied, stating that Sara had forced herself on him.99 Sara felt 
ashamed and was concerned about how her brother thought of her.100 
Later the manager began calling Sara a “whore” and a “slut.”101 When 
                                                                                                                      
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 975–76. 
94 Policy Statements—Sexual Harassment, Am. Acad. of Child & Adolescent Psychia-
try (Oct. 1992), http://www.aacap.org/cs/root/policy_statements/sexual_harassment; see 
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 449 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that “Doe ex-
plained that she had kept the [sexual conduct with a teacher] a secret because she feared 
the repercussions of disclosure”); Leach v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., No. EV98-
0196 C-Y/H, 2000 WL 33309376, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2000) (finding that a student 
failed to report sexual harassment because she felt ashamed, was afraid to tell her mother 
for fear of upsetting her, and was afraid that no one would believe her that a teacher was 
sexually fondling her). 
95 Policy Statements—Sexual Harassment, supra note 94. 
96 Id.; see also Doe v. Estes, 926 F. Supp. 979, 988 (D. Nev. 1996). In 1996, in Doe v. Estes, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada explained: 
Children are often reluctant to report invasions of their bodily integrity. They 
may fear reprisals by their attackers, they may harbor doubts that their attack-
ers’ fellow grownups will display sympathy or willingly credit their accounts, 
and they all too frequently are paralyzed by the shame that attends subjection 
to sexual abuse. 
926 F. Supp. at 988. 
97 See Jones, 990 A.2d at 975–76; Policy Statements—Sexual Harassment, supra note 94. 
98 Sara Doe Complaint, supra note 82, at 6. 
99 Id. at 7–8. 
100 Id. at 8. 
101 Id. 
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Sara and the manager argued, he threatened to tell her parents about 
their relationship.102 Sara was ashamed and fearful of how her parents 
would respond to her conduct with the manager.103 She did not realize 
that as the adult, her manager was responsible for the abuse.104 Ulti-
mately, the manager was convicted criminally for abusing Sara.105 
 Sara’s conduct in response to her manager’s manipulations sup-
ports the Jones court’s findings.106 She concealed her manager’s abuse 
and the resulting trauma from her parents.107 She reported feeling 
humiliation and shame.108 Had not the manager continued to tele-
phone her from jail following an unrelated larceny conviction, Sara’s 
parents might never have discovered the cause of her plummeting 
grades and bizarre behavior.109 Lanning’s profile of a sexually abused or 
manipulated teenager, like Sara, helps us understand why adolescent 
“consent” might deserve special treatment under the law. 
D. The Tobias Irony 
 Despite the Tobias court’s finding that minors may “knowingly and 
voluntarily” participate in sexual relations, it distinguished incest.110 
The court explained that incest differs from other sex crimes because 
“the act itself is unlawful,” regardless of the minor’s involvement or 
consent.111 An important purpose of the incest law is the protection of 
minors and the court found it inconceivable that a minor in an incest 
                                                                                                                      
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Sara Doe Complaint, supra note 82, at 8. 
105 Id. at 10; see Minute Order Entering Guilty Plea, People v. Cosio, No. S9-09852 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 1999) (order entering defendant-manager’s guilty plea to count one for 
unlawful sexual intercourse with Sara). 
106 Compare Jones, 990 A.2d at 976 (explaining “compliant victims” often do not disclose 
the sexual abuse because of feelings of “shame, embarrassment and guilt”), with Sara Doe 
Complaint, supra note 82, at 8, 9 (describing Sara’s unwillingness to disclose the sexual 
abuse because of feelings of shame, embarrassment, and insecurity). 
107 Sara Doe Complaint, supra note 82, at 8–9. 
108 Id. at 8–10. 
109 See id. at 9; B. Cole, Jail Incident Report #99-R-174, at 1–2 (Aug. 16, 1999) (on file with 
the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department) (documenting Defendant-manager’s use of 
contraband cell phone to telephone Sara); R. Mitchell, Santa Cruz Sheriff’s Office, Incident 
Report #99-7955, at 4 (Aug. 9, 1999) (on file with the Santa Cruz County Sherriff’s Depart-
ment) (documenting conversation between Sara’s mother and deputy at Sherriff’s office 
regarding phone calls between Defendant-manager and Sara). 
110 Tobias, 21 P.3d at 762. 
111 Id. at 763. 
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case would be criminally liable as an accomplice to the incest rather 
than a victim.112 
 The irony is that the Tobias court supported its reasoning concern-
ing the nature of the incest crime with reference to section 261.5. Ac-
cording to the Tobias court, section 261.5 was intended to protect mi-
nors and made sexual intercourse with minors a strict liability 
offense.113 At the same time, the court stated that the California Legis-
lature “implicitly acknowledged that, in some cases at least, a minor 
may be capable of giving legal consent to sexual relations.”114 How 
could this 1970 legislative initiative implicitly mark the Legislature’s 
abandonment of “the age of consent” and its rejection of a minor’s in-
capacity? If anything, section 261.5 confirms eighteen as the age of con-
sent and, standing alone, reinforces that minors lack the capacity to 
consent to sex with adults.115 The Tobias majority opinion is internally 
inconsistent on this issue. 
1. Offending Minors 
 Another analytical snarl discussed in Tobias and other criminal 
cases becomes apparent when one considers that minors commit sex 
crimes against other children. One might readily agree that adults 
should carry the burden of resisting criminal sexual temptation when 
contemplating adult-child sexual conduct. But, what if all of the actors 
are children? Do criminally offending minors have legal capacity? This 
may be the wrong question to ask in the context of the criminal prose-
cution of a minor for offenses committed against another child. Rather, 
the more appropriate question is whether the law is designed to protect 
the offending minor. 
 Arguably, legislatures draft sex crime statutes to protect minors 
from abuse by adults who wield more power and authority than the mi-
nor. The law protects those who cannot adequately protect themselves. 
When a minor wields the power over another child and sexually ex-
ploits the child, the sex crime law does not protect the offending minor 
who is not the contemplated innocent target. Thus, whether or not an 
offending minor possesses what we might call legal capacity, we can 
choose to prosecute that offending minor to protect the less powerful 
and less sophisticated child target. Whether we prosecute the offending 
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 762. 
114 Id. 
115 See Cal. Penal Code § 261.5 (West Supp. 2012). 
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minor the same way that we would prosecute and punish an adult is a 
separate question.116 
 Finally, what about the “Romeo and Juliet” example where two mi-
nors engage in consensual sexual intercourse, thereby becoming vic-
tims of the other’s crime?117 Common sense should determine that 
case. If both children are victims, there is no classic offender to prose-
cute. In 1998, in People v. T.A.J., the presiding California appeals court 
opined that section 261.5 may criminalize conduct between minors.118 
The court explained that the decision to prosecute a minor for violat-
ing section 261.5 is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.119 One can 
only hope that common sense will prevail.120 The odd dictum in Tobias, 
and news of other “Romeo and Juliet” prosecutions, however, suggest 
that section 261.5 may not stand out as a beacon of judicious use of 
prosecutorial discretion.121 
2. A Voice of Reason: Chief Justice George’s Tobias Concurrence 
 In a Tobias concurring opinion, then Chief Justice George ex-
pressed concern. He disputed the Tobias majority’s reasoning regarding 
the legislative intent in the 1970 revision of the rape statute.122 After 
reviewing the case law and historical acknowledgement of juvenile in-
                                                                                                                      
116 I am firmly opposed to prosecuting and punishing minors the same way that we do 
adults. Especially in the area of sex crimes, teenagers’ lack of sophistication and knowledge 
can lead to devastating results. Sexting is just one example of how the consequences (life-
time assignment to a sex offender registry) may not fit the crime. See Tamar Lewin, Rethink-
ing Sex Offender Laws for Youths Showing Off Online, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1. 
117 See Tobias, 21 P.3d at 762. 
118 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 339 (Ct. App. 1998); see Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(b). The 
statute states, “Any person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
minor who is not more than three years older or three years younger than the perpetrator, 
is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(b). 
119 T.A.J., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341. 
120 See generally Meredith Cohen, Note, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & Pol’y 717, 724–25 
(2007) (arguing for the decriminalization of consensual teenage sex). 
121 See Brenda Goodman, Man Convicted as Teenager in Sex Case Is Ordered Freed by Georgia 
Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2007, at A9. The Supreme Court of Georgia held: 
[The Superior Court of Monroe County] properly ruled that Wilson’s sentence 
of ten years in prison for having consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old girl 
when he was only seventeen years old constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment, but erred in convicting and sentencing Wilson for a misdemeanor crime 
that did not exist when the conduct in question occurred. 
Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501, 502 (Ga. 2007). The case was remanded to the ha-
beas court to reverse Wilson’s conviction and discharge him from custody. Id. 
122 Tobias, 21 P.3d at 766–67 (George, C.J., concurring). 
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capacity, Chief Justice George distinguished the new section 261 from 
section 261.5 pertaining to minors.123 He offered that section 261 
(rape) involves a victim incapable of consenting because of a mental 
disability or one who was challenged by violence or force.124 Chief Jus-
tice George noted that a minor’s “consent” might be relevant to the 
prosecution of section 261.125 He argued that the California Legislature 
did not intend to establish that a minor is capable of legally consenting 
to sexual relations.126 Instead, Chief Justice George contended that in 
section 261.5, the Legislature merely recodified a preexisting principle 
in section 261, which provided that a minor’s consent to sexual inter-
course with an adult does not relieve the adult of criminal responsibil-
ity.127 In turn, by amending section 261, the Legislature enhanced the 
criminal severity of raping a minor, requiring that it be accomplished 
by additional circumstances specified in the statute.128 
 Chief Justice George’s reasoning causes one to wonder what the 
Legislature might have done differently, if anything, had it heard Spe-
cial Agent Lanning’s testimony about non-resistance. Query whether it 
would have left criminal sexual intercourse as part of the forcible rape 
statute. Here, Chief Justice George provided an explanation of the 
statutory revision that differentiates the elements of the section 261 
offense from the section 261.5 crime while still preserving the tradi-
tional view that minors lack the legal capacity to legally consent to sex. 
 A final point by Chief Justice George in his concurrence detailed 
that the Tobias majority’s analysis conflicts with section 261.6. Section 
261.6 reads: 
In prosecutions under Section 261, 262, 286, 288a, or 289, in 
which consent is at issue, “consent” shall be defined to mean 
                                                                                                                      
123 Id. 
124 Id. Chief Justice George quoted the 1970 version of section 261, stating that “sexual 
intercourse with a female constituted rape if, among other things, she was ‘incapable, 
through lunacy or other unsoundness of mind, . . . of giving legal consent,’ or her resistance 
was overcome by force or violence.” Id. at 766. The current version of the statute confirms 
George’s reading. Section 261(a)(1) refers to those “incapable, because of a mental disorder 
or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent.” Cal. Penal Code 
§ 261(a)(1) (West 2008). Section 261(a)(2) refers to force and violence. Id. § 261(a)(2). 
Section 261(a)(3) mentions intoxication and anesthetic substances. Id. § 261(a)(3). Other 
subsections raise loss of consciousness, fraud, and duress. Id. § 261(a)(4)–(7). None of these 
subsections apply to developmental immaturity. See id. § 261(a)(1)–(7). 
125 Tobias, 21 P.3d at 766 (George, C.J., concurring). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 766–67 (noting, for example, by force or violence that overcame the victim’s 
resistance). 
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positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise 
of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and 
have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction in-
volved.129 
Note that section 261.6 does not list section 261.5, arguably because 
consent is not at issue as minors cannot legally consent. Chief Justice 
George asserted that the Court of Appeal accurately determined that 
the concept of “actual consent,” defined in section 261.6, is distinct 
from “legal consent.”130 
 So what was the actual intent of the 1970 California Legislature? In 
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed this very question.131 
II. The Intent of Section 261.5: Michael M. v. Superior Court of 
Sonoma County 
 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1981, involved an Equal Protection Clause challenge 
to California Penal Code section 261.5 because it originally criminal-
ized sexual intercourse with only minor girls, not with boys.132 Thus, 
only males faced criminal liability under the statute.133 In evaluating 
whether the statute constituted invidious sex discrimination, a plurality 
of the Court reviewed the Legislature’s intent, cautioning that question-
ing congressional motives or intent is troublesome and often elusive.134 
For example, the Court noted that in passing section 261.5, some legis-
lators may have been interested in protecting young females from the 
loss of chastity or physical injury while other legislators may have been 
espousing moral or religious views.135 
                                                                                                                      
129 Cal. Penal Code § 261.6 (West 2008). 
130 Tobias, 21 P.3d at 767 (George, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). In discussing 
People v. Young, 235 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Ct. App. 1987), George argued: 
The [Young] Court of Appeal thus properly recognized that a defendant might 
violate section 261.5 without also violating section 261, and that, although a mi-
nor cannot give legal consent to sexual intercourse, he or she voluntarily and 
willingly can participate in the act, and thus actually consent within the mean-
ing of section 261.6. 
Id. at 768 (footnotes omitted). 
131 See 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981). 
132 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 469–70. 
135 Id. at 470. 
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 Theorizing about chastity and physical injury, the Michael M. plu-
rality hypothesized about the possible intentions of legislators.136 Sig-
nificantly, the plurality made no mention of juvenile legal incapacity or 
of traditional “ages of consent.”137 Ultimately, the plurality deferred to 
California’s expressed goal, namely the prevention of “illegitimate 
teenage pregnancies.”138 The Court noted that California has a strong 
interest in preventing such pregnancies.139 
 Although the plurality affirmed the expressed goal of teenage 
pregnancy prevention offered by the state, this goal makes sense only 
for menarchal teenage females. The statute, however, prohibited sexual 
intercourse with all minor girls, not just those who might become 
pregnant.140 The statute was grossly over inclusive, thus calling into 
doubt that the officially stated goal was the primary motivator. Now that 
the statute applies to protect minor boys and girls, the pregnancy pre-
vention justification makes even less sense. Given that this legislation 
came on the heels of the “Summer of Love” (1967) and Woodstock 
(1969), the more likely legislative intent in 1970 was the prevention of 
sexual activity with all of California’s daughters.141 
A. An Alternative Interpretation: Justice Brennan’s Michael M. Dissent 
 In his Michael M. dissent, Justice Brennan strongly contested the 
legislative intent adopted by the plurality.142 Justice Brennan noted that 
California courts and commentators had only recently advanced the 
theory that the legislature had intended that the California statutory 
rape law safeguard against pregnancy in young women.143 Justice Bren-
nan traced the historical development of section 261.5, concluding that 
legislators initially promulgated it because people considered young 
women to be incapable of legally consenting to sex.144 Legislators, who 
valued the chastity of young women, assumed them to be particularly in 
need of protection from the State.145 Conversely, people deemed young 
                                                                                                                      
136 Id. at 469–71. 
137 See id. at 469–76. 
138 Michael M., 450 U.S. at 479. 
139 Id. 
140 See Act of May 19, 1913, ch. 122, § 261, 1913 Cal. Stat. 212, 212 (amending section 
261 of the Penal Code relating to the crime of rape). 
141 Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture of the 1960s and ’70s, at 7, 
189 (Peter Braunstein & Michael William Doyle eds., 2002). 
142 Michael M., 450 U.S. at 494–96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
143 Id. at 494. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 494–95. 
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men capable of making such decisions and, thus, not in need of special 
protection from the law.146 Justice Brennan’s analysis highlights the 
stereotypes traditionally enforced with respect to juvenile capacity to 
consent to sex.147 
 Justice Brennan elaborated in several footnotes, tracing the legisla-
tive history and statutory precursors to section 261.5.148 Justice Bren-
nan explained, “[t]he only legislative history available, the draftsmen’s 
notes to the Penal Code of 1872, supports the view that the purpose of 
California’s statutory rape law was to protect those who were too young 
to give consent.”149 Later revisions of the statute postponed the age of 
consent, ultimately to the age of majority—eighteen.150 
 In a separate footnote, Justice Brennan tracked the case law inter-
preting statutory rape.151 Quoting People v. Hernandez, a 1964 decision 
by the California Supreme Court, Justice Brennan explained that a mi-
nor female was “‘presumed too innocent and naive to understand the 
implications and nature of her act.’”152 Thus, Justice Brennan stated 
that the law of statutory rape may be explained in part by a popular 
conception of the moral, social, and personal values preserved by a 
young woman’s sexual abstinence.153 
 Justice Brennan’s emphasis on the historical and stereotypically 
gendered motivation for California’s section 261.5 is much more con-
sistent with my lay understanding of California’s “statutory rape” law 
from when I was a teenager growing up in California in the 1970s. Who 
knew, but a handful of lawmakers and other jurists, that section 261.5 
would later be billed as “the Teenage Pregnancy Prevention Act of 
1995”? How many Californians today know that there is no California 
“statutory rape law”? Do they know that sexual intercourse with a minor 
is illegal but that the victim may not be able to recover civilly if he or 
she “consents”? 
                                                                                                                      
146 Id. at 495–96. 
147 See id. at 496. 
148 Michael M., 450 U.S. at 495 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
149 Id. 
150 See id. 
151 Id. at 495 n.10. 
152 Id. (quoting People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 674 (Cal. 1964)) (‘“An unwise dis-
position of her sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to herself and the social mores by 
which the community’s conduct patterns are established. Hence the law of statutory rape 
intervenes in an effort to avoid such a disposition.”’). 
153 Id. 
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B. Michael M.: The California Supreme Court Opinion 
 The earlier Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County California 
State Supreme Court decision also contributes to our understanding of 
the conclusions reached in People v. Tobias.154 The defendant, Michael 
M., argued that a validation of section 261.5 would necessarily signal 
the state’s disrespect for the autonomy and independence of girls.155 In 
upholding the constitutionality of section 261.5, the Michael M. court 
used familiar language, rejecting the assertion that upholding the con-
stitutionality of section 261.5 “creates adverse inferences concerning 
the capacity of minor females to make intelligent and volitional deci-
sions.”156 The court went on to state that the Legislature’s adoption of 
section 261.5 indicates the “obvious truism that minor females are fully 
capable of freely and voluntarily consenting to sexual relations,” noting 
that if this were not so, then the uniform charge brought in such cases 
would be forcible rape.157 
 Here the court walked the fine line between dismissing or infantil-
izing minor females and attributing to them legal status and capacity 
which they had not held before under California law.158 As explained 
above, the Tobias California Supreme Court majority revisited this dis-
cussion of when a minor “knowingly and voluntarily” engages in the 
sexual act.159 
 In his Tobias concurrence, however, Chief Justice George argued 
that Michael M. referred to a girl’s voluntary behavior, not her legal 
consent or capacity.160 Recall the discussion of voluntariness by the ma-
jority opinion in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. In that sexual harass-
ment civil law opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court found that voluntary 
participation did not equate with legally significant consent.161 Recall 
also Special Agent Lanning’s discussion of acquiescence and how it 
only seemed to indicate consent.162 In Tobias, George explained that a 
minor may “voluntarily” engage in sexual relations but cannot “legally 
consent” to such acts.163 Chief Justice George contended that Michael 
                                                                                                                      
154 See People v. Tobias, 21 P.3d 758, 762 (Cal. 2001); Michael M. v. Superior Court of 
Sonoma Cnty., 601 P.2d 572, 575–76 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
155 Michael M., 601 P.2d at 576. 
156 Id. (emphasis added). 
157 Id. (emphasis added). 
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159 Tobias, 21 P.3d at 761–62. 
160 Id. at 767. 
161 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1985). 
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163 Tobias, 21 P.3d at 768 (George, C.J., concurring). 
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M. concerned actual consent, not legal consent, and thus, lent no sup-
port to the Tobias majority’s reasoning.164 
 The rest of the discussion by the California majority in Michael M. 
foreshadows George’s Tobias interpretation. The California Michael M. 
majority noted that section 261.5 does not address a young woman’s 
ability to consent.165 Rather, the court stated that the statute simply pro-
hibits sexual intercourse with underage females, thereby rejecting con-
sent as a defense.166 According to the Michael M. court, “[i]n this regard 
section 261.5 is no different than a variety of other statutes which pro-
hibit minors from engaging in certain activities of much less conse-
quence to the minor, no matter how well informed, how knowledgeable and 
how willing or consenting the minor might be.”167 The Michael M. California 
court clarified that section 261.5 was not a radical shift by the California 
Legislature but just another treatment of juvenile legal incapacity.168 
III. Civil Law Adoption of Criminal Case Dictum 
 Whether or not the California Supreme Court accurately inter-
preted the intent of the California Legislature in People v. Tobias, Cali-
fornia criminal courts continue to sanction adults who engage in sex 
with a minor.169 When civil courts began to rely on the Tobias 2001 dic-
tum however, protections for minors eroded.170 In 2005, the California 
Appeals Court case Donaldson v. Department of Real Estate created the 
proverbial slippery slope.171 
A. The Slippery Slope: Donaldson v. Department of Real Estate 
 The Donaldson court analyzed the California Department of Real 
Estate’s revocation of a twenty-four-year-old licensee’s real estate license 
after discovering that the licensee had seduced his sixteen-year-old sis-
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169 See 21 P.3d 758, 761–62 (Cal. 2001); see, e.g., Glenda Anderson, Willits Man Gets Jail 
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3d 577, 585–88 (Ct. App. 2005); Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 
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171 See 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 585–88. 
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ter-in-law.172 Donaldson, the licensee, pled no contest to charges 
brought under section 261.5 of the California Penal Code.173 In revok-
ing Donaldson’s real estate license, the California Real Estate Commis-
sioner construed his actions to be “[s]exually related conduct causing 
physical harm or emotional distress to a . . . non-consenting participant 
in the conduct.”174 Relying on Tobias, the California appellate court re-
versed the revocation.175 Summarizing its holding, the Donaldson court 
concluded that the Commissioner had incorrectly relied on the offense 
of statutory rape which, according to the Donaldson court, the Legisla-
ture had abolished thirty-five years prior.176 Accordingly, the Donaldson 
court stated that the California Supreme Court had authoritatively dis-
avowed the presumption of non-consent solely based on the minor’s 
age.177 Through this professional discipline case, the Tobias dictum 
made its way into California civil law precedent. 
1. Donaldson Facts and Procedural History 
 While Donaldson’s wife was away on a business trip, her sixteen-
year-old sister took care of the Donaldson children one evening.178 Dur-
ing his wife’s absence, Donaldson gave his sister-in-law marijuana and 
the two engaged in sexual activities.179 Later, Donaldson was charged 
with two counts of furnishing marijuana to a minor and a violation of 
section 261.5.180 A court ultimately dismissed the marijuana charges.181 
The judge suspended the sentence on the section 261.5 felony convic-
tion and placed Donaldson on three years probation. 182 
 At an administrative hearing following the disciplinary charges, 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) asked, “[D]o you understand that 
because you are an older man in a position of power that [the minor] 
did not consent to the act that followed or do you think she con-
sented?”183 Donaldson responded, “I think I had consensual—she con-
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sented, and in every sort of the way.”184 The ALJ concluded that 
Donaldson could retain his realtor license on a restricted basis because 
the sexual misconduct was an isolated incident.185 
 The appellate decision does not indicate whether any of the re-
viewing Donaldson tribunals received expert testimony. The ALJ’s de-
termination, however, sounds like a finding that Donaldson was, what 
Special Agent Lanning might have called, a “situational offender.”186 
Still, the few facts relayed in this case also reveal that Donaldson gave 
his minor sister-in-law marijuana.187 That conduct may be more consis-
tent with grooming behavior. Special Agent Lanning suggested in Jones 
v. United States that once an abuser cultivates a relationship of trust and 
dependence with a victim, the abuser may manipulate the victim’s feel-
ings, encouraging the child to overcome their sexual inhibitions.188 
Perhaps the Real Estate Commissioner felt that Donaldson had be-
haved in this manner with his sister-in-law. 
 The Real Estate Commissioner issued her own decision, contrary 
to that of the ALJ.189 She relied on the victim’s statements in investiga-
tive reports to find that the intercourse was rape.190 The Commissioner 
asserted that circumstantial evidence and the police report indicated 
that the minor felt “paralyzed” and “forced” to participate in the sexual 
activity.191 The Commissioner noted that, although Donaldson subse-
quently realized that his sister-in-law was not old enough to consent le-
gally and that he betrayed a position of trust, Donaldson failed to rec-
ognize that his sister-in-law did not consent to the act.192 Rather, the 
Commissioner noted, Donaldson believed the act was consensual, de-
nied that he raped his sister-in-law, and did not seem to appreciate that 
his position of trust and physical size may have been coercive.193 She 
found that these intimidating factors led to the minor’s feelings of pa-
ralysis.194 
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 The reviewing district court found that the police reports consti-
tuted hearsay and were admissible only to support or explain other 
unidentified, circumstantial evidence.195 In response to the petition for 
the writ of mandamus, the district court held that the available admissi-
ble evidence did not support the Commissioner’s decision and re-
manded it for further consideration.196 With a new decision omitting 
any discussion of actual consent, the Commissioner again found against 
Donaldson.197 The district court denied a subsequent petition.198 
2. The Donaldson Appellate Decision 
 When reviewing the second Real Estate Commission decision 
against Donaldson, the appellate court reviewed the Legislature’s pas-
sage of section 261.5, the meaning of non-consent and the age of con-
sent, and the function of the Real Estate Commission.199 The court rea-
soned that section 261.5 effectively restored rape “to its traditional 
outlines.”200 It explained that the California Legislature abolished the 
crime of statutory rape thereby implicitly foreclosing the presumption 
of juvenile non-consent.201 The Donaldson court recommended refer-
ring to conduct prohibited under section 261.5 as “criminal inter-
course” to avoid confusion.202 It offered no support other than the To-
bias dictum for its interpretation of the 1970 legislative amendments to 
section 261 and the passage of section 261.5. 
 The Donaldson court also considered the “age of legal consent.”203 
The court explained, “[t]his phrase, like ‘statutory rape,’ has passed 
into lay usage and been incorporated into folk law.”204 The court ex-
plored the activity and the age to which the phrase referred.205 In a de-
tailed discussion, citing to both civil code sections and case law, the 
court concluded that the phrase was used primarily in the context of 
consent to marriage—even with respect to the former “tort of ‘seduc-
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tion of a person under the age of legal consent’ . . . .”206 It meant the 
age at which consent to marriage would garner legal authority.207 Ac-
knowledging, however, that many courts have used the phrase in refer-
ence to sexual relations, the Donaldson court held that the Legislature 
abolished statutory rape as a crime, and with it, the “age of consent.”208 
 In its introduction, this Article reported that California set eight-
een as “the age of consent.” Donaldson corrects that report; there is no 
“age of consent” in the state of California.209 
 Apparently, neither court—Donaldson nor Tobias—considered that 
the California Legislature intended merely to simplify the forcible rape 
statute (section 261) and to more precisely classify criminal (but per-
haps unresisted) sex with a minor (section 261.5). Such reorganization 
arguably allowed the Legislature to confirm what had been implied in 
the so-called statutory rape provisions of the former penal code: that 
minors are legally incapable of consenting.210 
3. Donaldson’s Flaws 
 As noted above, many jurists suggest that the California Legislature 
actually intended to abandon the notion of non-consent. Rejecting 
Chief Justice George’s Tobias concurrence, the Donaldson court stated 
that the concurrence merely established “an artificial distinction be-
tween ‘legal’ and ‘actual’ consent . . . .”211 The court continued that 
although this distinction provided a mechanism for preserving the pre-
sumption of non-consent, which preceded the 1970 legislation, Chief 
Justice George failed to provide a legal reason for doing so.212 
 Several problems surface in the Donaldson court’s line of reason-
ing. First, the discussion in the majority’s Tobias opinion was nonbind-
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ing dictum.213 Section 261.5 was not at issue in Tobias.214 The Donaldson 
court was not obligated to follow the Tobias majority’s dictum. 
 Second, one wonders why the court thought the notion of non-
consent advocated for in the Tobias concurrence was unsound.215 Did 
the court really think that all minors have the capacity to consent? Did 
the Donaldson court really believe that the civil law should afford six-
teen-year-old girls the irrevocable opportunity to consent to sex with a 
twenty-four-year-old boss, teacher, or brother-in-law? 
 Third, why did the court disfavor the “artificial distinction” be-
tween “legal” and “actual” consent?216 The law often makes such “artifi-
cial distinctions” to protect “consenting” people. For example, would 
the Donaldson court have erased the “artificial distinction” between “le-
gal” and “actual” consent of the mentally challenged and the disori-
ented elderly? Would it have repealed “cooling off” periods for the 
revocation of adult consent given in door-to-door sales?217 Such “artifi-
cial distinctions” protect minors and others from unscrupulous or savvy 
operators who can extract actual consent in ways the rest of us deem 
unfair. The Donaldson court could have embraced the distinction be-
tween legal and actual consent to interpret the real estate regulation at 
issue. Had the court read the regulation to require actual non-consent, 
as opposed to legal non-consent, it might have reached the same result 
in favor of the licensee. 
 Fourth, the Donaldson court could have accepted section 261.5 as 
the prescriptive rule of law and the reason for confirming a minor’s 
non-consent. Instead, the court stated that the presumption asserting a 
minor’s inability to consent to sexual relationships was inferred from 
statutory law that was abandoned by the California Legislature.218 The 
court noted: “That consent is not a defense to section 261.5 means only 
that for reasons of policy, the Legislature has chosen to treat sexual in-
tercourse with a minor as a criminal act notwithstanding that the minor 
consented to it.”219 The Donaldson court concluded that such a law, re-
gardless of how widely it is accepted, cannot remain established when 
the Legislature elects to change course.220 
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 Here again, several problems arise with the Donaldson court’s rea-
soning. Concerning legal definitions, the court casually labeled non-
consent a presumption.221 Presumptions may be refuted. The court 
offers no evidence, however, that minors have the capacity to give legal 
consent.222 The court falls into the same pit that entraps so many: the 
pit of conflation concerning actual consent and legal consent. The 
court ignores the requirement of legal capacity.223 
 The Donaldson court also referred to “reasons of policy” which un-
dergird the Legislature’s decision not to permit consent as a defense in 
a section 261.5 case.224 What policy? Isn’t a determination of juvenile 
incapacity the logical basis of a legislative policy judgment that teenag-
ers cannot legally consent to sex? Why else would the Legislature 
choose to criminalize sex with minors if it thought that their “consent” 
was meaningful, advised, appropriate, etc.? Just to prevent pregnancy? 
If minors have (legal) capacity, surely they can plan against pregnancy. 
The truth is that we know teenagers take risks that adults do not 
take.225 Did the Legislature pass section 261.5 simply because it was po-
litically expedient? How is it expedient to criminalize the conduct and 
then allow courts to credit the associated consent in the civil trial? 
Something else must have been motivating the Donaldson decision. 
4. Donaldson’s Footnote 10 
 In a footnote, the Donaldson court revealed important additional 
information which bears on this discussion.226 The court explained that 
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tion. The Commissioner’s function is to protect the public from unqualified 
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although it felt Donaldson’s conduct was “troubling,” it did not “ha[ve] 
any bearing on his or her qualifications as a real estate professional un-
der prescribed criteria.”227 Essentially, the court thought that Donaldson 
had been punished enough by the felony conviction for seducing his 
sixteen-year-old sister-in-law and that he was still qualified to work in the 
real estate business.228 The court did not think that a felony conviction 
for criminal intercourse with a minor should interfere with his ability to 
pursue his profession.229 Of course, this reasoning has nothing to do 
with whether the minor had actual or legal capacity to consent to sex 
with her brother-in-law. 
 Another interesting aspect of this footnote is the court’s characteri-
zation of Donaldson’s conduct as “troubling.”230 Why was it troubling to 
the court if the conduct was consensual and the minor possessed legal 
capacity? And, why was the liaison just “troubling” and not “outrageous,” 
“despicable,” “predatory,” “contemptuous,” or some other stronger ad-
jective? After all, this was a felony. Donaldson seduced his wife’s minor 
sister while his wife was out of town and when the sister was caring for 
their children.231 No matter the Donaldson court’s actual motivation, one 
can now trace its adoption of the Tobias dictum to the Doe v. Starbucks 
case. 
B. The Tobias Legacy: Doe v. Starbucks 
 Jane Doe was sixteen-years-old in July 2005 when she began work-
ing at Starbucks.232 Timothy Horton, who was then twenty-four-years-
old, supervised and worked closely with her.233 Doe alleged that Horton 
repeatedly asked her out and that she initially spurned his advances.234 
In pleadings, Doe claimed that while at work and in front of coworkers, 
Horton made “‘perhaps hundreds’” of profane, sexually explicit re-
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marks concerning his sexual interest in her.235 Eventually, Doe acqui-
esced to Horton’s advances in the hopes that he would stop.236 In No-
vember or December 2005, they allegedly engaged in sexual activity.237 
Doe stated, 
[Horton] demanded that I perform oral sex on him, which I 
did. I felt like I had to—that I had no choice . . . . I felt that, 
because he had given me marijuana and I had smoked it with 
him, I had to do what he said, because he was my Supervisor 
and I didn’t want to lose my job. 238 
Horton insisted that Doe not disclose their relationship to anyone.239 
 Starbucks management and employees suspected that Horton was 
having an “extracurricular” relationship with Doe.240 An assistant man-
ager reminded Horton of Starbucks’s policy and warned Horton that 
he could not date Doe.241 Horton denied any dating relationship.242 
Doe did not deny their involvement when a shift leader, Candice, asked 
her about her offsite relationship with Horton.243 When Horton found 
out about the exchange with Candice, he shouted at Doe.244 Both Doe 
and Horton subsequently denied their involvement when other Star-
bucks employees confronted them.245 Store Manager, Lina Nobel, con-
tacted a Starbucks human resources director, Sarah Kelly, about her 
concerns regarding Horton and Doe.246 No one, however, fully investi-
gated the matter.247 
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 Doe informed her mother about her sexual relationship with Hor-
ton in February 2006.248 Doe’s mother requested that Starbucks take 
steps to protect her daughter and conduct an investigation of the alleg-
edly illicit relationship.249 Nobel, the store manager, agreed to ensure 
that Doe and Horton not have contact until she completed an investi-
gation.250 Nobel questioned Doe who admitted that she was involved 
sexually with Horton.251 Horton continued to deny anything other than 
a professional relationship with Doe.252 Nobel did not feel like she was 
in a position to question Horton about a sexual relationship with 
Doe.253 Moreover, she did not make a credibility determination be-
cause she did not believe it was her place to pass judgment.254 Star-
bucks did not otherwise formally investigate.255 
 Although Starbucks initially failed to take action against Horton, 
others interceded for Doe.256 Doe’s mother eventually learned from 
Nobel that Horton had denied Doe’s allegations of wrongdoing.257 No-
bel was concerned that terminating Horton would lead to a wrongful 
termination claim.258 Presumably at her mother’s urging, Doe ultimately 
requested a “transfer[] to a different Starbucks store because she ‘felt 
like she had to.’”259 In 2006, Doe left her job to enroll in a mental 
health treatment facility.260 State authorities charged Horton with crimi-
nal unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor for his conduct with Doe, 
to which he pled guilty.261 In a parallel civil action, Doe alleged sexual 
harassment and torts claims against Starbucks and Horton.262 
 In response to Starbucks’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
court analyzed Doe’s capacity to consent and whether she did consent 
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to Horton’s advances.263 The Starbucks court explained that resolution 
of the arguments concerning Doe’s capacity influenced several claims 
at issue, including Doe’s sexual harassment claim.264 
 First, the court evaluated California Penal Code section 261.5 
which Doe argued confirmed her incapacity to consent to sexual con-
tact.265 The Starbucks court disagreed, quoting the relevant Tobias dic-
tum that “in some cases at least, a minor may be capable of giving legal 
consent to sexual relations.”266 The court failed to explain why, if some 
minors are capable of giving legal consent, section 261.5 is a strict liabil-
ity offense. The court acknowledged that Tobias was a criminal case but 
held that its rule had been extended to civil cases by Donaldson.267 
 In support of her contention that minors lack the capacity to con-
sent to sexual intercourse with adults, Doe also cited Doe v. Oberweis 
Dairy, a 2006 case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit.268 The court determined that Oberweis had “little persuasive 
effect” because it was a Seventh Circuit case which failed to consider 
California law and controverted the precedent established by Tobias.269 
A closer examination of Oberweis, however, may demonstrate that it had 
more to offer in the Starbucks sexual harassment case than the Starbucks 
California federal district court concluded. 
C. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy: An Alternate View 
 Like Starbucks, Oberweis was a sexual harassment case involving a 
sixteen-year-old teenager and her twenty-five-year-old supervisor.270 Like 
California, Illinois prohibits sex between minors, defined as those un-
der age seventeen, and adults.271 The Illinois Oberweis federal district 
court, which decided the case in the first instance, determined that the 
“unwelcomeness” requirement applies in employment cases involving 
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minors and that Doe had not complained of “unwelcome” conduct.272 
The court noted that Doe voluntarily visited her supervisor Nayman on 
the day of the sexual encounter and continued to interact with Nayman 
socially, outside of the workplace, following the encounter.273 Thus, the 
court concluded that there was no issue of material fact as to whether 
the sexual conduct was unwelcome.274 
 Like the Tobias Court, the Oberweis district court clearly equated 
voluntariness with legal consent.275 The district court dismissed Doe’s 
sexual harassment case against Oberweis Dairy because she did not re-
sist or otherwise indicate that the conduct was unwelcome.276 
 In reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit described in de-
tail how Nayman interacted with Doe and other employees.277 Specifi-
cally, it noted that Nayman inappropriately grabbed and groped nu-
merous employees, including Doe.278 The court explained that Nayman 
did these things at work but also invited female employees to his apart-
ment for sexual encounters.279 In fact, Nayman had intercourse with two 
other female employees, one a minor, at his apartment prior to the en-
counter with Doe.280 The Seventh Circuit’s rendition of the facts por-
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but it is undisputed that Plaintiff found these remarks “flattering.” Despite 
these allegedly harassing workplace events, Plaintiff continued to visit with 
Nayman socially outside of work, even after Plaintiff’s mother prohibited 
Plaintiff from visiting Nayman. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to whether the conduct which occurred at Plaintiff’s workplace was 
not severe or pervasive. 
Id. 
273 Id. at *6. 
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275 See Tobias, 21 P.3d at 761–62; Oberweis Dairy, 2005 WL 782709, at *6. 
276 See Oberweis Dairy, 2005 WL 782709, at *6. 
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trays Nayman as what Special Agent Lanning refers to as a “situational 
offender” who opportunistically exploits his young subordinates.281 
 Emphasizing the age disparity between Nayman and Doe, the Sev-
enth Circuit found that although Nayman had not committed forcible 
rape, he had committed “statutory rape.”282 The court reasoned that 
statutory rape is a crime because minors may be unable to make respon-
sible decisions about engaging in sex.283 The court noted that in Illinois, 
as elsewhere, the severity of the crime increases with the age disparity 
between the parties.284 The court explained the graduated crimes with 
the theory that minors are likely to have difficulty resisting the flatteries 
of adults.285 In this case, the plaintiff was nine years younger than Nay-
man at the time of intercourse.286 Thus, in its holding, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Oberweis implicitly recognized the “communal experience” re-
garding teenage capacity that the California appellate court, in People v. 
Hillhouse, identified and labeled three years earlier.287 
 Acknowledging the “unwelcomeness” requirement under Title VII 
but understanding that minors may not always make responsible deci-
sions about sex, the Oberweis appellate court devised a plan for dealing 
with adolescent “consent” to sex.288 Judge Posner, writing for the court, 
explained that it wanted to avoid reclassifying sex that a state deems to 
be nonconsensual as consensual.289 Posner steered clear of “intractable 
inquiries into maturity that legislatures invariably pretermit by basing 
entitlements to public benefits (right to vote, right to drive, right to 
drink, right to own a gun, etc.) on specified ages rather than on a stan-
dard of ‘maturity. . . .’”290 He suggested that courts defer to the state’s 
age of consent, which reflects the judgment of average maturity for 
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sexual matters, rather than determining whether a Title VII minor was 
able to welcome the sexual overtures of an adult.291 Thus, the court 
concluded that for Title VII cases, the age of consent should be the rule 
of decision.292 
 Unfortunately, a serious problem with this plan becomes obvious 
immediately. The Seventh Circuit in Oberweis acknowledged that the 
protection afforded to teenage employees by Title VII varies by jurisdic-
tion because the age of consent differs between states.293 The court, 
however, mistakenly calculated that the variance would be limited to a 
“fairly narrow band.”294 For states, such as California, with no age of 
consent, adolescent “consent” arguably garners legal significance, 
whether or not the minor has legal capacity in the criminal context.295 
The Seventh Circuit clearly did not know in 2006 that only a few 
months earlier in California, the Donaldson state district court had de-
clared the end of the “age of consent” in California civil cases.296 Thus, 
the Seventh Circuit offered the nation a logical but seriously flawed 
formula for responding to adolescent “consent” in sexual harassment 
and sexual abuse cases. In states, such as two of the most populous, 
California and New York, where state criminal and civil law conflict, this 
formula provides no clear guidance on how to treat adolescent non-
resistance or “consent.”297 
D. The Hidden Conflicts Regarding “the Age of Consent” 
 Return to the Google search on ages of consent.298 The results do 
not warn that state civil law in any given jurisdiction may conflict with 
ages of consent designated for criminal prosecution. In a 2004 article, I 
reviewed the conflicting laws across the United States and evaluated the 
chances that a sixteen-year-old, such as Sara (or her guardian who 
would sue on her behalf), might have in pursuing a sexual harassment 
or other related tort case.299 The article determined that the outcome 
would depend upon where she “consented” and sued, in addition to 
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which claims she brought.300 She would have almost no chance for suc-
cess in twenty-four states where the age of consent was sixteen or 
lower.301 That number grew to thirty-five if courts in eleven states re-
jected the specific aggravating facts of her case.302 Those states would 
treat her as an adult and bar most claims.303 In the remaining fourteen 
states, conflicts between criminal and civil outcomes made predictions 
virtually impossible.304 
 Eight years later, California should be added to the list of states 
where Sara’s chances for success in civil court are slim to none. Espe-
cially now that California has rejected Oberweis, one can anticipate that 
other skeptical judges will grant summary judgment for employers 
against acquiescing teenagers. The trend at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century is to punish teenagers for their lack of resistance and failure to 
abstain. That result becomes literal if an underage male fathers a child 
via the illicit sexual intercourse with an adult female.305 For example, in 
1996, in County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., a fifteen-year-old de-
scribed sex with his thirty-four-year-old consort as “‘a mutually agree-
able act.’”306 Therefore, the California appellate court refused to re-
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1996). 
306 Id. at 844. 
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lease him from liability for child support, finding that the adolescent 
plaintiff was not an innocent victim of the adult’s criminal acts.307 
 This discussion of legislative intent and case law interpretation 
shows inconsistencies that are problematic. 
1. Misguided Confusion? 
 Does misguided confusion or paternalistic judgment concerning 
sexually active teenagers explain the current state of affairs for adoles-
cents? The Tobias court was not reviewing Penal Code section 261.5 nor 
was it reviewing a civil sexual harassment claim when it determined that 
California minors might give legal consent to sex.308 With its 2001 pro-
nouncement, the Tobias majority set California civil and criminal law 
completely at odds. Neither the California Legislature nor the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has responded in the intervening decade to ame-
liorate this resulting situation. As the precedent expands, scholars will 
find it less plausible to attribute the resulting conflicts between civil and 
criminal law to continuing misunderstanding or confusion. 
 Fortunately for Sara Doe, her case settled in 2002, before the 
Donaldson court extended the Tobias dictum to the civil context.309 Star-
bucks’s Doe was not so lucky. After the Starbucks court, relying on the 
Tobias dictum, decided that the issue of Doe’s actual consent was a tri-
able fact, the case settled out of court.310 Had the case not settled, Doe 
could have anticipated an invasive trial based on her maturity and “con-
sent” under the “unwelcomeness” standard of the California fair em-
ployment practice statutes, despite the fact that her adult consort, Tim 
Horton, was prosecuted under section 261.5.311 Other teenagers should 
anticipate that defense attorneys will use the Starbucks summary judg-
ment opinion to defend sexual harassment and other civil rights and 
tort claims across the country. Judges already use the Starbucks prece-
dent outside of the employment context.312 
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2. Beyond Employment—Doe v. Willits Unified School District 
 A recent California Title IX case adumbrates potential issues for 
teenagers across the country.313 Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 forbids discrimination in educational institutions.314 In 2010, in 
Doe v. Willits Unified School District, the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of California ruled on a defense motion concerning dis-
covery of the fifteen-year-old student-plaintiff’s sexual conduct with her 
thirty-eight-year old teacher, her sexual history, and the student’s “con-
sent.”315 Following a sexual liaison with her teacher, Doe asserted a Ti-
tle IX claim and various tort claims against her teacher, her principal, 
and the school district.316 During Doe’s deposition, which was eventu-
ally suspended due to discovery conflicts, defense counsel questioned 
Doe about her sexual history.317 Although the court denied discovery 
related to Doe’s sexual history, it granted discovery concerning 
whether she “welcomed” or “consented” to her teacher’s sexual over-
tures.318 
 The Willits court acknowledged that other circuits had examined 
whether the “unwelcomeness” requirement is properly considered in 
cases where a minor alleges sexual harassment at an educational insti-
tution.319 The court found that cases outside of the Ninth Circuit have 
explored whether consent is an element of a Title IX case.320 The court 
noted that in each of those cases, the cause of action did not include 
consent.321 The court found that the paramount theme from these 
cases was that welcomeness or consent should not be conflated with 
capacity to consent.322 Moreover, when capacity is absent, the court 
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concluded that any evidence of welcomeness or consent is irrelevant as 
a matter of law. 323 
 This analysis demonstrates that the Willits court recognized the 
complexity of the issue. Here, the court evinces the distinction between 
“voluntary and willing participation,” and capacity to consent, which 
may produce actual, legally significant consent.324 The Willits court 
seemed persuaded by the reasoning from other courts regarding the 
issues of capacity to consent and adolescent “consent” to sexual activity 
with an adult.325 
 In a footnote, however, the Willits court explained that California 
case law is unsettled regarding the relevance of “consent,” citing Tobias 
and Donaldson.326 The court then ruled on the discovery of Doe’s “con-
sent,” finding that cases have resolutely held that “consent” and “wel-
comeness” are not elements of a Title IX claim.327 Still, because the Wil-
lits court refused to define the elements for the cause of action in that 
case, it held that questions on the issue of “welcomeness” and “consent” 
with regard to the minor’s sexual relationship with an adult constituted 
permissible discovery.328 
 This compromise and acknowledgement of the Tobias dictum, later 
adopted in Donaldson, essentially ensured that Doe would face invasive, 
humiliating, and perhaps traumatizing inquiries by defense counsel 
during her deposition. One can expect that defense counsel would fo-
cus on whether Doe set limits with her thirty-eight-year-old teacher, thus 
casting Doe as the “responsible” actor. 
 News articles, not referenced in the Willits court opinion, gave 
more details about the Doe-Smith liaison, details that the defense coun-
sel could use.329 For example, the district attorney suggested that Doe 
at least acquiesced to the sexual conduct.330 One news article reported, 
“[t]he relationship, believed to have taken place over several months, 
was not forced, [Mendocino County District Attorney Meredith] Lin-
tott said. But a 15-year-old cannot legally consent to a sexual relation-
ship with a 38-year-old, she said.”331 Despite what the district attorney 
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believed, the Willits civil judge left it open as to whether Doe could le-
gally consent and ruled to allow discovery on the matter.332 Smith’s 
guilty plea to one count of unlawful sex with a minor under sixteen and 
receipt of a six month county jail sentence with thirty-six months of 
probation may not make a difference in the civil case.333 
 The Willits discovery ruling highlights how the conflicts in Califor-
nia put our teenagers at risk. It also threatens to chill future reporting 
of sexual exploitation. A teenager, who understands that she may have 
to endure rigorous examination in front of her parents and strangers 
on whether she “came-on” to an adult teacher, may opt not to report 
offensive conduct at all. Because the Willits case began as a Title IX fil-
ing, it could serve as guidance in other federal Title IX cases across the 
nation. Critics might argue that other states will not follow California 
into the legal tangle created by Tobias and the inconsistent treatment of 
adolescent “consent.” Still, do we really want to take that chance with 
our teenage children? 
3. Crediting Adolescent “Consent” 
 This discussion of “the age of consent” and the appropriate legal 
weight to give adolescent “consent” also highlights the consequences 
that result when we do not afford adolescent “consent” legal signifi-
cance. Some states allow teenagers to consent to abortion services and 
all states allow teenagers to consent to treatment for sexually transmit-
ted diseases.334 If we negate adolescent legal capacity, we risk the incon-
sistency of affording adolescents autonomy with respect to these impor-
tant healthcare decisions.335 Perhaps California courts, scholars, and 
jurists are reluctant to classify minors as legally incapacitated because of 
the understanding that it might prevent minors from accessing lifesav-
ing medical treatment. Thus, the conundrum becomes clear: how to 
account for “developing capacity” while also affording teenagers the 
chance to make decisions in their own best interests. 
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IV. Adolescent Assent Instead of Immature “Consent” 
 More than seven years ago, I offered a strict liability plan to ensure 
the protection of our malleable teenagers at work.336 The plan recom-
mended that the law be revised to account for adolescent workers, their 
developmental abilities or “developing capacity,” and the phenomenon 
of their sexual exploitation.337 Under this strategy, the law would per-
mit an adolescent who “consented” to sex with an adult supervisor or 
coworker to retract that “consent” if she realized during her minority, 
or shortly thereafter, that her adult partner had taken advantage of her 
naïveté or “developing capacity.”338 I recommended that “consent” 
should not provide a defense to a civil claim at any phase of a case and I 
still endorse such a strict liability approach.339 
 The treatment of adolescent “consent” by California courts de-
serves serious review. In a recent article, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direc-
tion: Science, Teenagers, and the Sting to “The Age of Consent,” I noted similar 
treatment of “consent” by New York courts, suggesting that nationwide 
reform may be necessary.340 Wholesale elimination of ages of consent 
wreaks havoc, placing unnecessary burdens on developing teenagers 
and empowering savvy predators. Although a detailed exploration of 
options is beyond the scope of this paper, I relay here another proposal 
in brief: society can make “consent” voidable in a variety of contexts—as 
it does in contract law.341 
 This novel theoretical approach prescribes that the law should 
credit adolescent “consent,” not as legal consent but as adolescent as-
sent.342 As opposed to medical assent, adolescent assent does not re-
quire associated parental permission or consent. Unlike consent, ado-
lescent assent conveys no associated threshold level of capacity. Similar 
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to consent by a minor under contract law, assent is voidable by the mi-
nor. 
 Assent operates slightly differently from traditional, voidable con-
tract consent by a minor, however. As noted, assent presumes no legal 
capacity. Moreover, the minor may void assent only with good reason. 
Adult abuse, adult exploitation of an unfair advantage, and breach of a 
duty owed to the minor, all justify revocation. Additionally, parents 
cannot void a minor’s assent. Although parents may offer their wise 
guidance, undue influence by a parent or other adult nullifies revoca-
tion. If a court determines that the original decision was, borrowing 
from family law, in the minor’s best interests it can reject the revoca-
tion.343 On the other hand, if a minor successfully voids her assent, a 
court cannot admit it into evidence or permit discovery on the matter. 
A criminal prosecutor might still prosecute an adult who has sex with 
an assenting minor, however, because the assent operates solely to bene-
fit the minor. 
 To understand the impact of adolescent assent, reconsider Doe v. 
Willits Unified School District.344 Recall that the Doe in this case allegedly 
agreed to sex with her teacher, Clint Smith.345 Under the assent 
scheme, Smith might still face prosecution for statutory rape or, in Cali-
fornia, unlawful sex with a minor.346 A successful criminal prosecution 
vindicates a society that does not want sexual relationships between its 
minor children and their teachers. If Doe maintains her assent, there is 
no parallel civil case; the controversy ends. 
 If, however, Doe believes that Smith coerced, deceived, or other-
wise took advantage of her when she originally assented, she can nullify 
her assent and bring a sexual harassment or tort charge (through her 
parents or guardian) to recover damages. Following a motion in limine, 
the court will accept Doe’s revocation. Criminal sanctions for adults 
who seduce minors clearly suggest that those adults have abused or 
otherwise breached a duty owed the children. If Smith raises assent as a 
civil defense in a Title IX or tort case, the court should deny discovery 
and exclude admission of evidence related to Doe’s assent. Because the 
law assumes that Doe lacked capacity, discovery into the assent, for evi-
dence that would be used against Doe, is not in a minor’s best interests. 
                                                                                                                      
343 See Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (explaining the “presumption that a 
fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child”). 
344 No. C-09-03655-JSW (DMR), 2010 WL 2524587 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2010). 
345 See Anderson, supra note 329. 
346 See Cal. Penal Code § 261.5 (West Supp. 2012). 
2013] Doe v. Starbucks and the Age of Consent in California 43 
                                                                                                                     
By allowing Doe to void her assent, society encourages teachers to re-
frain from engaging sexually with minors. 
 Thus, Doe makes two choices: to assent and whether to revoke her 
assent. Society permits Doe to revoke her assent in order to protect her 
against the poor choices she might make and to empower her to rem-
edy the mistake. A court holds Doe to her assent if she errs in the revo-
cation of assent. At that point, however, if someone challenges Doe’s 
revocation, the court scrutinizes the participating adult’s actions, not 
the moral purity or maturity of the adolescent. The court considers 
whether the revocation is based on good cause given the adult’s con-
duct and developmental advantage. The court’s analysis emphasizes the 
circumstances, not the individual minor. Under this approach, all of 
the Does examined in this paper could have nullified their assent. 
 This theory of adolescent assent is “consistent with what we know 
about adolescent development; teenagers need maturing experiences 
and the opportunity to practice their skills.”347 Teenagers may not have 
the capacity to accurately assess and make every decision, but this ap-
proach permits teenagers to avoid those that they later believe were 
inept, asinine, or inappropriate. Proposals like this one should spark 
conversation for the germination of new ideas and approaches. 
Conclusion 
 Arguably, California, New York, and other states are brewing a bit-
ter dram in their civil legal treatment of juveniles. Additionally, Califor-
nia civil decisions are compounding problems first apparent in criminal 
law case precedent. The existing conflicts between criminal and civil 
law treatment of adolescent “consent” leave teenagers vulnerable, espe-
cially to sexual predators. Court conflation of acquiescence, consent, 
and capacity highlights the need for legal reform and intervention. 
Rather than eliminate default guidance or attempt to implement a myr-
iad of separate rules for the regulation of adolescent activities and 
“consent” across the nation, society should explore new options and 
perhaps give voidable adolescent assent legal significance. 
 Assent would take the venti jolt out of Starbucks. 
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